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This article proposes a practically feasible framework for compiling Multidimensional Distributional 
National Accounts (MDINAs) serving two functions: a comprehensive measure of (components of) 
net worth and their distribution, and a link to macroeconomic statistics. I break down 12 components 
of marketable wealth by wealth and income groups, and three functions of wealth for Austria, Finland, 
France, Germany, and Spain. MDINA complemented by summary indicators reveal large heterogene-
ity in the degree of inequality, and shed light on differences in the structure of wealth portfolios across 
and within countries. I combine data collected in the largely harmonized HFCS survey and adjust 
for remaining differences in survey modes regarding the treatment of the top tail using (Generalized) 
Pareto models estimated from rich lists or top wealth shares derived from tax data and leaked informa-
tion on wealth held in offshore tax havens. Measured inequality increases strongest in countries where 
surveys refrain from appropriate top- tail corrections.
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1. intRoduction
Over recent years, more and more economists, and social scientists in general, 
have been looking at phenomena from a distributional angle. A major prerequisite 
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for research of this form as well as targeted policy decisions is the availability 
of multidimensional, distributional data comparable across countries (see also 
Atkinson and Brandolini, 2001).
Comparability can be achieved by incorporating distributional data into the 
widely- used and well- established System of National Accounts (SNA). Further, 
it is only by jointly assessing micro- and macro- data that the impact of macro- 
economic developments for different sections of society is revealed. Therefore, I 
link the definitions used in the SNA to currently existing micro- data in the form of 
top- tail adjusted survey data, and create detailed break- downs.
Such break- downs are usually compiled for wealth or income itself and are com-
monly referred to as Distributional National Accounts (DINA). The idea of DINA is 
an old one. Piketty (2003) revived the work pioneered by Kuznets (1955), who com-
bined tabulated income data with national income series. Piketty’s work for France 
was extended to the US (Piketty and Saez, 2003), US, the UK (Atkinson, 2005), and 
henceforth to many more countries worldwide (for surveys of this literature, see 
Atkinson et al., 2011, Alvaredo et al., 2013). A milestone constitutes the creation of 
The World Top Incomes Database, later re- named the World Inequality Database, with 
an extended focus on income and wealth (Alvaredo et al., 2011- 2017).1
This article goes a step further and creates detailed breakdowns of total wealth 
and single wealth components by sections of society: household wealth, house-
hold income, and functions of wealth (following Fessler and Schürz, 2017), termed 
Multidimensional Distributional National Accounts (MDINA). I supplement these 
accounts by meaningful summary indicators enabling easy- to- spot variation: abso-
lute and relative deviations across groups, top shares, and a truncated Theil index 
measuring between- groups variation. I also compute these indicators for each 
wealth component.
In Europe, both, the (legally binding) European System of National Accounts 
(ESA) and a comprehensive and regularly compiled household survey,The 
Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS),2 are largely, though not 
entirely, harmonized across participating countries. Establishing harmonized 
DINA and MDINA could hence build on these advantages and provide powerful 
data sources usable by policy- makers as well as researchers.
In this spirit, I identify, describe and perform all the steps necessary to com-
pile such accounts and adjust for artificial deviations because of differences in sur-
vey modes across countries in the HFCS. The resulting manual points out possible 
improvements aiming for even better MDINA in the future complementary3 to the 
efforts of international working groups steered by the OECD, Eurostat and the 
ECB. In particular, the work of the Eurosystem Expert Group on Linking Macro 
12018 WID.world World Inequality Report, http://wir20 18.wid.world/, retrieved on June 26, 2018.
2The Household Finance and Consumption Survey, Wave 2, Core and derived variables catalogue: 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/home/pdf/resea rch/hfcn/HFCS_Core_and_deriv ed_varia bles_Wave2.pd-
f?8d194 75a7e db8ff 7de6d 99a88 5e527ec, retrieved June 27, 2018.
3Kennickell (2019) performs similar analyses with a focus on wealth using the US Survey of 
Consumer Finances (SCF). Arrondel et al. (2014), Kuypers et al. (2016) and Kuypers et al. (2019) assess 
wealth and, as here, use HFCS data. Bartels and Metzing (2019) perform complementary work with a 
focus on income using the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU- SILC).
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and Micro Data for the Household Sector (see EG- LMM, 2020) relates to wealth 
and is thus closely tied in with this article.4
I select a set of five countries: Austria (AT), Finland (FI), Germany (DE), 
France (FR), and Spain (ES). This choice allows me to holistically demonstrate 
how to compile cross- country comparable MDINA using HFCS data. In partic-
ular, these countries comprise all the variety needed for meaningful comparisons: 
they differ greatly from a geographical and demographic point of view, in terms of 
households’ typical wealth composition, and, most importantly, in survey- specific 
aspects. With regard to the latter, I refer to differences in survey sampling strategies 
that are not harmonized across participating countries.
Refraining from oversampling very affluent households— a group small in 
number but large in combined wealth— such as in Austria, results in a particularly 
large impact of the top- tail adjustment, whereas the reverse holds for Finland, 
where oversampling of the rich is combined with incorporating a great deal of 
administrative data into survey responses. As a result, top- tail corrections using 
national rich lists lead to an increase in measured net worth of only 5 percent in 
Finland and but 38 percent in Austria (see also Chakraborty and Waltl, 2018; Bach 
et al., 2019).
When breaking down wealth by income groups, I find the lowest inequality in 
Finland and Spain: there, the 20 percent income- richest households are on average 
five to six times wealthier than the 40 percent income- poorest households. By com-
parison, for Austria this measure amounts to roughly 11, for Germany about ten, 
and for France nine— revealing substantial variation.
The results reported here already constitute a rich data source, but the focus is 
still forward- looking: What is currently possible and what could be achieved in the 
future? How can MDINA be gradually incorporated into the framework of regu-
larly compiled official statistics, and how can this be achieved in as harmonized a 
way as possible across countries? Further, the breakdowns presented are designed 
as building blocks that can be combined to perform own analyses, for example, 
creating breakdowns for different wealth definitions or using specific categories 
such as only financial or housing wealth. This building- block strategy aims to be a 
source rather than a substitute for other initiatives, such as The Credit Suisse Global 
Wealth Report.5
The hybrid approach acknowledges that a complete integration of distribu-
tional data into the framework of NA is currently un- feasible, as finer breakdowns, 
and more harmonization between definitions specific for macro- and micro- data 
4The joint OECD- Eurostat Expert Group on Measuring Disparities in a National Accounts 
Framework focuses on distributional indicators for income and consumption (see Zwijnenburg et al., 
2017).
5The Global Wealth Report is published annually by the globally acting wealth manager, investment 
bank and financial services company Credit Suisse. The study estimates total wealth holdings and dis-
tributional breakdowns for the adult- population worldwide. The estimates are derived in a similar fash-
ion as here although there are three main distinctions: the pure focus on wealth without linking it to 
other categories such as income and types of households, a missing match with totals reported in the 
national accounts (NA), and an individual instead of a household perspective that I follow here in- line 
with NA methodology. Details are provided on a yearly basis in the respective Databooks, see https://
www.credi t- suisse.com/about - us/en/repor ts- resea rch/globa l- wealt h- report.html, retrieved on January 
15, 2020.
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would be needed. Thus, hybrid MDINA consist of two parts: the integrated account 
contains variables on households’ balance sheets that can be directly linked to an 
item’s distributional structure inferred from micro- data. The supplement account 
adds further items necessary to obtain a comprehensive measure of total wealth, 
but lack a macro counterpart. Changes in the way micro- data are collected and 
finer breakdowns of national accounts will hopefully gradually enable the reallo-
cation of some variables from the supplement account to the integrated account.
There are, however, also items that are likely to permanently remain in the 
supplement account, such as consumer durables (e.g. vehicles) as they fall outside 
the scope of NA. Nevertheless, leaving these components out would have import-
ant distributional implications given that vehicles constitute a major portfolio com-
ponent for low- income and low- wealth households.
The hybrid approach enables the compilation of MDINA at an early point in 
time, as full integration (which is currently not feasible in many countries) is not a 
prerequisite, but can be achieved gradually over time. Yet, the approach guarantees 
that distributional data still comprise all relevant wealth components. Thus, from 
the very beginning MDINA serve two functions: first, they establish a link between 
aggregate macroeconomic indicators and the system of measuring macroeconomic 
activity— the National Accounts. Linking enables an understanding of the allo-
cation of gains and costs associated with macroeconomic trends and, vice versa, 
monitoring the influence of inequality on the wider economy. Second, MDINA 
constitute by themselves a comprehensive measurement of wealth distributions, 
which thus need to cover all relevant components of wealth— also those not being 
part of NA.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: Section 2 proposes the 
hybrid approach and discusses how to link and break- down the micro- and macro- 
data used. Issues related to the insufficient representation of the wealthiest mem-
bers of society in surveys are discussed in Subsection 2.4. and a top- tail adjustment 
is performed. Subsequently, Section 3 describes and computes MDINA. Section 4 
concludes. A comprehensive appendix complements the article by providing the full 
set of quantitative results, supporting figures, and further background information.
2. MultidiMenSional diStRibutional national accountS
2.1. Integration versus Dashboard Approach
Integrating distributional information into the existing system of macroeco-
nomic indicators is crucial if  distributional statistics should be considered and dis-
cussed as prominently and broadly as other macroeconomic indicators. For this 
purpose, linking macro- data as reported in the NA with distributive information 
stemming from micro- data is essential. The result is called DINA.
Because of the harmonization of the NA across countries, the integration of 
distributional data into this system will thus also lead to comparable statistics on 
inequality enabling multi- country analyses and cross- country comparisons.
The terms DINA and MDINA suggest that NA should be taken as they 
currently are, and simply enriched by distributional breakdowns. These distribu-
tional breakdowns can be compiled from survey data, and/or administrative and 
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register data. This is, however, not the approach I follow here, as the NA are too 
narrow in scope to measure net worth of private households comprehensively. 
In addition, some concepts that are appropriate for NA may not be suitable for 
meaningful MDINA as the NA have not primarily been designed to measure fine- 
grained components of households’ wealth. For instance, NA leave out consumer 
durables— such as vehicles— although these play a similarly important role in total 
households’ wealth as listed shares or holdings in investment funds. The recording 
of dwellings and land is very specific in the NA and suboptimal when aiming to 
better understand private wealth and its distribution.
Thus, MDINA need to be understood more broadly than just a breakdown 
of existing NA aggregates. Breakdowns should not be limited by the specificities 
of the NA. Therefore, the framework of MDINA relies on NA whenever appro-
priate, but calls for finer divisions of NA whenever needed and additional “sup-
plement” information when it is essential in order to achieve a meaningful overall 
wealth measurement. This approach, which aims neither for a complete separation 
between NA and distributive indicators (a “dashboard” approach) nor a complete 
alignment of distributional indicators to the current NA framework (an “inte-
grated” approach), is labeled the “hybrid approach.”
The hybrid approach serves two functions of MDINA: (1) a link between 
macro- data and distributional data, and (2) a comprehensive measure of wealth 
distributions by itself. One may argue that the NA and breakdowns thereof are 
not designed to serve the second function as the focus in the NA is primarily on 
measuring economic activity and not households’ wealth (which is in fact just a 
by- product), and thus these statistics are not meant to be interpreted as compre-
hensive measures of wealth inequality. Although it is in principle possible to steer 
which numbers are published by statistical offices or central banks, it is impossible 
to control how they are interpreted by data users. It is almost naive to assume 
MDINA would not be understood and interpreted as a measure of wealth inequal-
ity. Focusing on narrow wealth concepts for the sheer sake of alignment with NA 
concepts may thus contribute to a misinformed public discourse.
Answers to the question of how to deal with imperfect comparability between 
micro- and macro- data usually go into the direction of either restricting the anal-
ysis to suitably comparable components or analyzing wealth distributions without 
relating them to NA. Either approach is limited in terms of serve only one of  the 
two functions stated above.
Table 1 demonstrates the hybrid MDINA approach schematically. Let there 
be n + m components of wealth (assets and liabilities alike) that are essential to 
describe households’ wealth holistically. Thereby, n components are linkable 
between the micro- and macro- source, and m components do not reach a sufficient 
degree of comparability.
For all n + m components, group- specific aggregates are computed from the 
micro- source. I form such vertical groups in subsection 2.5 by net worth, income 
quintiles, and functions of wealth. In principle, any other breakdown by mean-
ingful quantitative and qualitative characteristics could be achieved in a similar 
manner.
The n suitably comparable components are linked to the respective NA instru-
ments; that is, group- specific sub- aggregates are scaled to exactly match the NA 
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aggregate. The scaling ensures that totals are consistent6 and at the same time rela-
tive proportions of asset classes derived from the micro- data are preserved. Linked 
components jointly form the Integrated Account.
The remaining m components are not sufficiently comparable but still essen-
tial to describe households’ wealth in its entirety. These components are not scaled 
because of missing macro totals but directly compiled from micro- data. These m 
components form the Supplement Account.
Group- specific net worth is obtained by horizontally summing all the group- 
specific components of wealth.7 Totals for each component of wealth are obtained 
by vertically summing over the group- specific sub- aggregates. Total net worth is 
thus equivalently either the sum of group- specific net worth or the sum of 
component- wise aggregates. As components of wealth are considered that fall out-
side the scope of NA (e.g. vehicles), the NA instrument net worth (B.90) is concep-
tually not comparable to the broader measure here.8
It is likely that further work on integrating and harmonizing micro- and 
macro- data will lead to an increase in suitably comparable components n, and a 
decrease in insufficiently suitably comparable components m. As the set of compo-
nents needed to comprehensively describe households’ net worth is defined a priori; 
that is, n + m is fixed, the size of MDINA will not change because of advancements 
in the integration process. Nor will group- specific aggregates suffer from concep-
tual comparability issues over time.9
2.2. Surveys versus Administrative Data
There are two main approaches (and hybrids thereof) to measuring the distri-
bution of households’ wealth: approaches based on household surveys and admin-
istrative data (see Alvaredo et al., 2016, for an overview).
Even when relying on seemingly objective, official tax data, the top tail may 
be underestimated because of “hidden wealth” stored in off- shore tax havens 
(Alstadsæter et al., 2018). On top, administrative data are usually not collected for 
the purpose of measuring wealth inequality. Thus, tax data describe wealth only 
partially and/or indirectly. Statistical procedures need to be applied to infer the 
wealth distribution.
Net worth taxes, that is, recurrent taxes on an individual’s net worth, could be 
directly used to impute the total stock. Yet, such taxes are rare and, if  applied, 
6The integrated components are mainly instruments in the financial accounts, which rely on coun-
terpart information obtained from banks or other financial institutions, and registers. It is fair to as-
sume that the totals are thus more reliable than the reported sums in the survey, which is why scaling— 
even without the idea of MDINA in mind— is desirable. See Appendix A.
7Note that liabilities enter the accounts with a negative sign.
8Hybrid MDINA could also be extended to what is sometimes called “augmented wealth’” that 
specifically includes all types of pension wealth (see also Table 17). This is particularly relevant for sta-
tistics about countries having in place fundamentally different schemes of public services, for example, 
the way pension wealth is treated in the Netherlands (see Honkkila and Kavonius, 2013; EG- LMM, 
2020).
9By freezing n + m there are no comparability issues arising from changes in the definition of net 
worth. Yet, when integrating further components these components will be affected by scaling, 
which— in the case of large quantitative mismatches— still lead to breaks in time series. These breaks 
are, however, of a different quality than breaks induced by changes in the concept of  net worth.
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usually subject to several exemptions. The OECD reports that the number of 
OECD countries levying individual net wealth taxes dropped from 12 in 1990 to 
only 4 in 2017 (OECD, 2018, p. 16). These four countries are France,10 Norway, 
Spain, and Switzerland.
Further complications related to tax data stem from the fact that only parts of 
wealth (i.e. the particular assets that the tax refers to) are captured, that the unit of 
measurement is often the individual rather than the household,11 and that the tax 
data source usually lacks sufficient information on the socioeconomic and demo-
graphic characteristics needed to create multidimensional breakdowns of net 
worth.
When aiming for internationally comparable statistics, the issue of important 
differences in the design of tax systems and recording practices lead to additional 
challenges. Relatively frequent changes in tax policies imply inconsistencies over 
time.
Wealth surveys, in contrast, are designed to collect all the components of wealth 
at once, and additionally provide a long list of socioeconomic and demographic 
information characterizing each household. Surveys also capture asset classes that 
do not generate observable income flows (e.g. owner- occupied housing, valuables, 
and vehicles). Survey weights facilitate grossing up results to population totals.
In contrast to tax systems, which differ strongly between countries, surveys 
can more easily be harmonized to produce comparable data across countries and 
over time. The HFCS is the result of such a harmonization endeavor of wealth 
surveys scatted across European countries and coordinated by the ECB. The sur-
veys are ex ante harmonized, that is, the survey design and definitions are harmo-
nized before the survey is carried out.12
Surveys, however, suffer from other types of drawbacks: they rely on sophisti-
cated sampling techniques to guarantee that survey weights lead to accurate results 
at a country level. Households are sampled based on different types of register 
data (social security numbers, addresses, unique personal identification numbers, 
etc.). The sampling is only as good as the underlying registers. Socioeconomic and 
demographic information linked to the register is used to enhance the imputation 
of the survey weights. Sampling procedures for complex, multipurpose surveys 
(such as the HFCS) are complicated and involve a certain degree of variability. 
As the registers and the included additional information used for sampling dif-
fer across countries, the sampling techniques constitute an obstacle in terms of 
harmonization.
10Since January 2018, the scope of the net wealth tax in France has been reduced and, since this 
date, covers only real estate assets and investments. Before, all non- business assets were considered.
11There is no consensus on whether the unit of recording should be individuals of households. 
Whereas income is generally attributable to an individual, joint ownership of (housing) assets, and thus 
also their joint benefit, is common practice. In addition, some countries offer the option of joint taxa-
tion for married couples or couples in a civil union. In this case, tax data partly reflect individuals and 
partly couples, whereas the latter may constitute the entire household or not.
12The Luxembourg Wealth Study collects and ex post harmonizes wealth surveys from a number of 
developed and emerging countries globally. See http://www.lisda tacen ter.org/our- data/lws- datab ase/. 
The OECD (2013) provides international guidelines for micro- statistics on household wealth, which are 
largely followed, thus facilitating international comparability.
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As wealth is usually highly concentrated at the top end of the distribution, it 
is particularly important for the sampling procedure to lead to an adequate repre-
sentation of wealthy households in the final sample. Thus, most survey compilers 
apply some type of oversampling strategy: therefore, the impact of every single 
observation is decreased, and the precision of the estimator is increased. 
Oversampling can only be applied when the register data used to sample house-
holds can be linked to wealth (or other information that at least correlates with 
wealth). The availability of such data as well as the permission to use them for this 
purpose differs across countries. This limits the reliability of data produced with-
out oversampling or relying on indirect ways for oversampling— thereby detracting 
from comparability across countries.13
Even the most sophisticated oversampling strategy is still unable to sufficiently 
capture the wealthiest of the wealthy and sufficiently correct for the so- called unit- 
non- response bias introduced by wealthy households systematically responding less 
frequently than less wealthy households. Thus, just as in the case of using tax data, 
a separate treatment for the top tail is needed. This is discussed in detail in subsec-
tion 2.4.
Furthermore, surveys are costly and time- consuming. The fieldwork often 
runs for several months, and data validation and processing need additional time. 
Accordingly, survey data are usually only disseminated with a substantial time lag. 
In addition, surveys are not conducted at high frequency. The HFCS, for example, 
is only conducted every 2– 3 years.14
Lastly, surveys rely on the ability and willingness of survey participants to 
accurately respond to all questions. Although some questions are simple, others are 
fairly difficult: For example, estimating the current market value of one’s main 
residence or a non- listed business is a complicated task. Cognitive biases may also 
act against accurately reported values.15 Whereas business owners or shareholders 
may be better informed about their possessions because of reporting obligations, 
owner- occupiers may have fewer incentives to closely follow trends in housing 
markets.
Surveys can be improved by making use of administrative data and mar-
ket prices within the survey itself. For instance, wages as part of income may 
not be asked for in the survey interview but could— with the permission of the 
 interviewee— be retrieved from administrative records. Likewise, mortgage reg-
isters or registers documenting the ownership and current value of stocks and 
investment fund holdings can help improve the quality of survey results. As dis-
cussed above, such additional data can also be used to improve the sample design— 
particularly for targeted oversampling.
13See subsection 2.4 and Table 4.6 in HFCN (2016) for an overview of oversampling strategies 
applied in the HFCS. See also Chakraborty and Waltl (2018) for a discussion of the consequences of 
shortcomings regarding oversampling procedures.
14Honkkila et al. (2018) discuss the inter- and extrapolation of linked data between and beyond 
survey waves.
15There is evidence that home- owners tend to overestimate the value of their home in- line with an 
owner- pride factor or endowment effect (for further references see Agarwal, 2007; Heston and 
Nakamura, 2009; Lepinteur and Waltl, 2021).
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Statistical matching of survey data and other data sources (e.g. market prices) 
is a possibility to validate survey responses and adjust responses ex post whenever it 
seems appropriate. Countries with digitized land cadastres can use this information 
to link land and properties to survey participants. These data, together with auto-
mated property valuation models based on market prices, can eventually also be 
used to perform plausibility checks regarding self- reported current property prices.
Figure 1 illustrates how wealth distributions can be compiled relying on 
administrative data only, or by linking administrative, self- reported, and market 
price data via a survey. The latter benefits from the higher accuracy of register data 
for some items yet simultaneously provides a link between all asset classes as well 
as socioeconomic and demographic characteristics.
The degree to which administrative data are currently used when compiling 
surveys differs strongly between countries. There has been a great deal of progress 
regarding the collection and digitization of data, which offers large potential 
toward increased quality of official statistics.16
In the HFCS, Finland appears to be the superstar with regard to combining 
register and survey data (see HFCN, 2016, pp. 24– 25). Register data are directly 
used for all income variables (except private transfers and interest received), edu-
cation, the ownership and number of cars and other vehicles, business wealth, 
ownership and values for mutual funds, bonds and listed shares. In addition, the 
current values of the household’s main residence and other properties is estimated 
based on the Population Information System and the data in the tax administra-
tion’s housing company stock register. Likewise, the current values of vehicles is 
estimated making use of data in several vehicle registers, price register systems, and 
websites advertising items for sale. Several components of liabilities are estimated 
by combining information on tax registers and survey data.
Nevertheless, it appears impossible to bring surveys to a level sufficient to 
capture the very top of the wealth distribution. Thus, an ex- post adjustment for the 
very top seems necessary also when the survey has been built based on a rich pool 
of administrative data.
Concluding, neither tax data nor survey data alone seem to be sufficient, 
mainly because of the wealth missing at the very top. Due to the increasing avail-
ability of survey data, their better alignment with the NA, and more comprehen-
sive list of socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, this article relies on the 
HFCS as the major source of information.
2.3. Established Links between the HFCS and NA
The HFCS has been specially designed to measure households’ wealth, its 
composition, and its distribution across households with different characteris-
tics. By contrast, the NA were not designed for this purpose, but with the aim of 
16Linking survey and administrative data is, however, a delicate issue and needs broad public ap-
proval. Interviewees need to give explicit consent when their survey responses are linked to other data 
sources on an individual level. The legal requirements regarding the possibility to use register data differ 
across countries. Jäntti et al. (2013) discuss the use of register data in the context of the EU- SILC 
survey.
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measuring the performance on an economy and the contributions of different sec-
tors. Households form just one out of several sectors.
The wealth concept followed in the HFCS is consistent with the OECD 
Guidelines for Micro Statistics on Household Wealth (OECD, 2013), which are the 
result of a broad discussion on how to define wealth in an internationally compa-
rable, feasible, and meaningful way.
Following the OECD guidelines, wealth is understood as “ownership of eco-
nomic capital. It is viewed as a dimension of people’s economic (or material) well- 
being, alongside income and consumption. There are other concepts of capital that 
are important to people’s well- being and complement the concept of economic 
capital, such as human capital, social capital and collectively- held assets. However, 
while they may have considerable economic value to the people that possess (or 
have access to) them, they are not material assets and liabilities over which people 
can exercise ownership rights. They are, therefore, deemed to fall outside the scope 
(of the guidelines)” (OECD, 2013, p. 26) and also this article. In particular, this 
wealth concept excludes social security pension wealth.17
In this article, net worth is composed of 12 components. Table  2 provides 
details and definitions.
The EG- LMM analyzes the conceptual definitions of several variables/instru-
ments appearing in the HFCS and the households’ sector balance sheet in the NA. 
The results are documented in EG- LMM (2020). As indicated in Table 2, liabilities, 
deposits, bonds, investment funds, and listed shares are conceptually suitably com-
parable across the two data sources.
Appendix A summarizes the established links and remaining challenges for 
each component of net worth. In particular, the special case of housing wealth 
is discussed in detail, and a pseudo- link is established by interpreting the residual 
between total housing wealth in the HFCS (net of real estate assets for business 
use) and the total value of residential structures in the NA as the value of residen-
tial land.
2.4. Adjusting Survey Data: The Missing Wealthy
The HFCS is a voluntary survey aiming to collect information on people’s 
assets and liabilities. Wealth is a very sensitive topic to be covered in a survey, and 
it is known that it is particularity difficult to adequately capture the wealthiest 
household in such a survey.
Oversampling wealthy households helps to increase the precision of survey 
results at the very top. If, however, wealthy households are more likely to refuse 
17Including pension entitlements leads to the concept of augmented wealth, which is an informative 
measure for itself  but should be treated separately from standard wealth inequality measure, as argued 
for instance by Roine and Waldenström (2009): “Conceptually, it is not unproblematic to include retire-
ment wealth in the personal wealth. On one hand, it is a fairly well- defined future benefit stream accru-
ing to each individual in society that highly influences the incentives of individuals to save for retire-
ment. On the other hand, individuals cannot freely access their pension wealth (e.g. to realize it before 
retirement age), which violates one of the fundamental aspects of private property rights to personal 
assets. For this reason, the distribution of augmented wealth should be treated separately from the 
conventional wealth inequality measurement.”
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participation than other households, oversampling is unable to correct a resulting 
unit non- response bias.
Because of the sheer importance of overall holdings by the wealthiest of the 
wealthy, additional effort to properly capture them appears of utmost importance 
when aiming for a comprehensive and informative measure of total wealth.
A possible approach could be to replace the top tail of the survey- implied 
wealth distribution by a parametric model. The model of choice is usually a Pareto 
distribution. The parameters of the Pareto distribution can be estimated by enrich-
ing the top survey observations with additional information describing the for-
tunes of the wealthiest of the wealthy.
In this article, I use three types of such extra information: rich lists, top wealth 
shares, and top wealth shares adjusted for wealth stored in offshore tax havens.
I make use of rich list data published by newspapers and report the fortunes 
of the richest individuals and families in a country (see Table 3). Vermeulen (2016, 
2018) develops the so- called regression approach to estimate the parameters of 
a Pareto distribution by combining top survey data with observations from the 
Forbes World’s Billionaires list. Bach et al. (2019) and Chakraborty and Waltl 
(2018) apply this regression approach but rely on national rich lists providing more 
information than the Forbes list.
Rich lists are often criticized for following in- transparent methodologies and 
source data. In addition, the lists do not follow a consistent measurement unit: 
sometimes individuals are listed, and sometimes fortunes are reported for the 
nuclear and/or extended family. Some names on these lists may refer to non- 
residents.18 Rich lists have, however, two important advantages: first, journalists 
aim to investigate the total wealth of the richest members of their country regard-
less of the location of the wealth and holding structures, and, second, they exist in 
many countries and often constitute the only piece of information about the for-
tunes of the wealthiest of the wealthy.
Another source of information describing the concentration of wealth are 
top wealth shares, as collected in the WID.world database (Alvaredo et al., 2011- 
2017). The methodologies applied are transparent, and the source data are of high 
quality. Typically, the main ingredient comprises tax data, which are combined 
with other administrative and survey data. The intersection of countries for which 
top wealth shares are currently available in the WID.world database and the list of 
countries studied here results in only France. The French series was compiled by 
Garbinti et al. (2018). In addition, I make use of top wealth shares compiled for 
Spain by Martínez- Toledano (2017).
I develop a methodology using a Generalized Pareto Distribution (GPD) 
inspired by Blanchet et al. (2017) combined with top wealth shares to adjust the 
top end of the HFCS. GPDs are a family of heavy- tailed distributions contain-
ing the standard Pareto distribution as a special case. The non- standard members 
are less restrictive modeling choices for the top tail: average wealth is not forced 
to increase proportionally when moving up the distribution; that is, the crucial 
18The lists have therefore been checked by members of the EG- LMM. Non- residents were removed 
whenever detected, and entries likely referring to family clans are randomly split into two to four sepa-
rate observations.
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modeling assumption in the standard Pareto case regarding the choice of starting 
point is less relevant. Details are provided in Appendix B.
As top wealth shares imputed from tax data may underestimate wealth con-
centration because of wealth stored in offshore tax havens, I also use adjusted top 
wealth shares provided by Alstadsæter et al. (2018). Top wealth shares are reported 
in Table 4.
Once the wealth distribution is top tail adjusted, I redistribute the adjusted 
amounts to the different components of wealth following an approach developed 
by Chakraborty and Waltl (2018). The idea is to rely on observed portfolio struc-
tures at the top and redistribute the adjusted amounts accordingly. I extend 
Chakraborty and Waltl’s approach designed for Pareto distributions to GPDs (see 
Appendix B). For reasons of comparability, I use the same starting point of the 
tail, that is, the threshold where the parametric model takes over the empirical dis-
tribution implied by the HFCS. The threshold is fixed at one million euro (see 
Chakraborty and Waltl, 2018, for robustness checks with this regard). In France 
and Spain, millionaires represent the top 3 percent.19
Adjusting the top tail of the HFCS wealth distribution leads to an increase 
in total wealth. The increase is large in all countries, which is not surprising given 
the substantial gap between the largest fortunes observed in the HFCS and the rich 
lists (see Table 3), or the large differences in top wealth shares implied by the HFCS 
and other data sources (Table 4).
Table 5 reports adjusted and unadjusted HFCS aggregates. Adjusted aggre-
gates rely on rich lists on a Pareto model for the top tail. The results across coun-
tries are quite different and reflect the quality of the survey and, in particular, the 
oversampling strategy, which differ strongly across countries.
In Spain and France, the underlying data to oversample wealthy households is 
ideal as it is based on personal wealth data. In Finland, no such data are available, 
but oversampling is applied based on personal income data, which at least cor-
relates with net worth. In addition, in Finland many variables are not collected via 
a survey but directly taken from registers, which is why some components of wealth 
are more trustworthy (see subsection 2.2). In Germany, an indirect geographical 
oversampling strategy is applied: strategically more households are sampled from 
high- income municipalities and wealthy street sections in municipalities with more 
than 100,000 inhabitants. Austria, in contrast, does not oversample at all.
Given these differences, one would thus expect that a top- tail adjustment is 
least important in Finland, Spain, and France, and most important in Austria, 
which is indeed the case. The overall increase in net worth amounts to 5 percent in 
Finland, 10 percent and 11 percent in Spain and France, respectively, 17 percent in 
Germany, and 38 percent in Austria.
Table 6 reports changes in HFCS aggregates for Spain and France when rely-
ing on different auxiliary data to perform the top- tail adjustment. When relying 
on top wealth shares derived from tax data only, changes tend to be lower than 
19As the HFCS- implied cumulative distribution function is not smooth because of survey weights, 
quantiles can only be approximated. In Spain, the threshold lies in the interval [96.5 percent; 97.0 per-
cent], and in France in [97.0 percent; 97.5 percent].
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when relying on rich lists. In contrast, when relying on wealth shares derived from 
top wealth shares incorporating offshore wealth, the resulting wealth distributions 
match the rich list adjusted distributions almost perfectly. Both, the overall changes 
and implied top wealth shares, are very close. In both countries, the adjustment 
based on rich lists leads to marginally lower adjustments than the adjustments 
based on tax and offshore wealth data.
For instruments that are more prominent at the very top end of the distribu-
tion (e.g. other businesses, bonds, and listed shares) I find a larger increase when 
relying on GPDs because of the accelerating steepness of a GPD as compared to 
a standard Pareto distribution. Future research needs to focus on identifying aux-
iliary data measuring portfolio structures at the very top to provide a final answer 
which results to trust more.
Top wealth shares are not yet widely available, whereas rich lists are. The 
good match between adjustments based on rich list and top wealth shares, when-
ever available, increases confidence in rich list adjustments for other countries. 
In the future, rich lists may become obsolete because of  increased informa-
tion on top wealth shares from more reliable sources. In the meantime, top- tail 
adjustments based on rich lists appear to be a reasonably trustworthy approach 
to make survey data more comparable and better suited for measuring wealth 
inequality.
Indeed, refraining from any type of top- tail adjustments appears to be 
highly unsatisfactory. First, the increases resulting from such adjustments are 
large. Ignoring the top tail leads to much lower degrees of measured inequality, 
distorts aggregates and means, and biases conclusions about portfolio composi-
tions. Second, the cross- country differences regarding the representativeness of the 
top tail are substantial. These differences mainly stem from an insufficient degree 
of harmonization of the survey design, in particular differences in sampling and 
oversampling, and the use of administrative data in the compilation process of 
the survey. Admittedly, a top- tail adjustment is far from perfect because of model 
assumptions and shortcomings in the auxiliary data. Still, the substantial differ-
ences in top- tail coverage suggest that HFCS results should not be compared if  not 
using a top- tail adjustment.
Accordingly, the hybrid MDINA presented in the next section consistently 
rely on top- tail adjusted data. Because of the wider availability of rich list data, the 
adjustments are based on these lists.
2.5. Vertical Groups
To this point, I have discussed the horizontal dimension of  MDINA: the selec-
tion of components of wealth. Equally important is the selection of groups for 
which breakdowns are created; that is, the vertical dimension of MDINA. In this 
article, I compile MDINA for wealth groups, gross income groups, and groups 
reflecting three major functions of wealth.
These groupings are selected as they provide a comprehensive picture of the 
distribution of wealth. Other groupings can serve answering specific questions 
and should be considered for official statistics: for instance, groups formed by 
equivalized disposable income representing living standards, groups representing 
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household types defined by the social relationships of household members (female 
or male singles, couples with different numbers of children, single- parent house-
holds, retired couples, etc.), and geographic groupings (administrative regions and 
urban versus rural areas).
It is important that the characteristics chosen for the vertical grouping of 
households refer to the entire household. A grouping by age or gender is prob-
lematic as these characteristics describe the “reference person” rather than the 
household. The reference person is supposed to represent the financially most 
knowledgeable person in the household. It turns out that far more men are 
selected to be this person than women. If  this choice does not only reflect 
financial knowledge but is also driven by gender stereotypes, such analyses will 
lead to biased results.20 Likewise, the age of  the reference person is an insuffi-
cient information: a 30- year- old reference person may be a child still living with 
her parents, a single person, a parent, etc. Publishing breakdowns by gender or 
age may thus easily lead to misinterpretation of  the data and potentially biased 
conclusions.
A meaningful choice for vertical grouping is wealth itself: how much of 
the total (or component- specific) wealth is owned by the wealthiest or the poor-
est members of society? A breakdown by net worth quintiles reports five groups 
each consisting of 20 percent of all households. From these breakdowns, one can 
directly derive quintile ratios and quintile distances that relate the average amounts 
held by the poorest 20 percent to the wealthiest 20% and thus provide an informa-
tive summary statistic for inequality.
In addition, top shares report the proportion of aggregate (component- 
specific) wealth held by the wealthiest 10 percent, 5 percent, or even 1 percent. 
These shares complement breakdowns by quintiles and facilitate the comparison 
of wealth concentration at the very top.
Income21 is an equally important household characteristic and another mea-
sure of material well- being. Households that are simultaneously income- rich and 
wealth- rich form the financial elite, whereas households that are income- poor and 
wealth- poor constitute the economically most vulnerable members of society. 
Thus, looking at the interconnectedness of income and wealth provides a more 
complete picture of material well- being.
The HFCS only records gross income, and thus the allocation of households 
to groups does not consider the re- distributional effects of a progressive tax and 
transfer system. Because I apply a relatively broad grouping by merging house-
holds by income quintiles, the exact income concept is less important. Nevertheless, 
20For illustrative purposes one can think of an extreme case scenario where men are always self- 
selected by the household to be the reference person and only in the absence of a male household 
member a woman will be interviewed. In this scenario, female- headed households are predominately 
single or single- parent households, which tend to be poorer than other types of households. Therefore, 
differences found for gender rather represent differences across household types, and thus provide mis-
leading information.
21For better comparability with net worth, total household income is considered and no equiva-
lence scaling is applied. Income contains employee income, self- employment income, rental income 
from real estate, income from financial assets, income from private businesses other than self- 
employment, pension income (public, occupational, and private), income from regular social transfers, 
unemployment benefits, and any other sources.
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breakdowns by equivalized disposable income would be an insightful addition as it 
describes well differences in the standard of living by considering the number of 
consumption units in each household.22
Looking at wealth and income together is a first step toward a multidimen-
sional approach to understand wealth inequality. To provide even deeper insights, 
I also provide breakdowns reflecting different functions of wealth and thus provide 
more information about the social implications of an unequal distribution of pri-
vate wealth. As proposed by Fessler and Schürz (2017), I divide the population into 
renters, owners, and capitalists. Renters do not own their home, they pay rent to 
landlords (the capitalists or the state), and mainly hold wealth for precautionary 
reasons. Owners make use of their wealth by living in their own home and thus do 
not pay rent. Usually, an owners’ home also represents her single most important 
asset. Capitalists are owner- occupiers who additionally generate income from their 
wealth by either renting out further properties and/or by owning a business. They 
make profit by employing renters or owners in their business, and selling goods or 
services to them or other capitalists. These categories thus represent the three most 
important functions of wealth23 as argued by Fessler and Schürz (2017): provision, 
own use, and income generation.
Figure 2 shows the allocation of households to net worth and income groups, 
and the groups formed by three functions of wealth. Across the entire Euro Area, 
slightly less than half  of the households belonging to the lowest wealth group also 
belong to the lowest income group. Overall, roughly 8.7 percent of all households 
are simultaneously income- and wealth- poor (AT: 10.2 percent, FI: 9.3 percent, 
FR: 8.8 percent, DE: 9.1 percent, ES: 6.1 percent). In contrast, 9.3 percent are both 
income- rich and wealth- rich. The shares are similar across the focus countries of 
this article (AT: 8.5 percent, FI: 9.2 percent, FR: 10.5 percent, DE: 9.2 percent, ES: 
9.3 percent).
Large shares of renters belong to the lowest two to three wealth quintiles. The 
share of renters belonging to the third wealth quintile varies across countries with 
different overall home- ownership rates.24 In countries with a high share of renters, 
this rate is relatively high (AT 50.8 percent, DE 61.0 percent) but it is much lower 
in countries with high home- ownership rates (ES: 3.5 percent, FI: 9.1 percent, FR: 
19.1 percent); that is, the existence of a substantial group of fairly wealthy renters 
appears to be a phenomenon of German- speaking Europe. The share of renters in 
the bottom two wealth groups is high in all countries except Spain (Euro Area: 81.8 
22The OECD- modified equivalence scale weights a household’s total disposable income by the 
number of household members. The equivalence scale considers the economic benefits of living in the 
same household (“economy of scale”) as well as difference in consumption needs of adults and chil-
dren. Thus, the equivalence scale attributes a weight of one to the first adult member of a household, a 
weight of 0.5 to any other adult household member, and 0.3 to all children below 14 years.
23Fessler and Schürz (2017) consider three more functions hierarchically above income generation: 
social status and prestige, transfer (gifts and inheritances), and economic and political power. Although 
these other functions are important, they may not be additively separable from other functions of 
wealth and almost impossible to be measured in a survey.
24Eurostat reports the following home- ownership rates for 2014: EU 69.9 percent, AT 57.2 percent, 
DE 52.5 percent, FI 73.2 percent, FR 65.0 percent, and ES 78.8 percent (based on EU- SILC data). See 
Figure 12 for the relative importance of real estate assets for different parts of the distribution. Figure 
11 depicts the share of renters and owners by wealth groups.
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percent, AT: 98.3 percent, FI: 73.5 percent, FR: 88.2 percent, DE: 94.7 percent, ES: 
36.5 percent). The share of renters belonging to the highest two wealth groups is 
very low in all countries.
In contrast, capitalists predominantly also belong to the highest wealth and 
income groups. The probability for a capitalist being also a member of the top 
income group ranges between 36 percent and 45 percent, and the probability to 
be in the top wealth group conditional on being a capitalist is even higher (54– 79 
percent). Overall, the share of households that are in the top income, top wealth, 
and capitalists group amounts to roughly 4.5 percent in the Euro Area. This share 
is slightly higher for France and Germany (AT: 3.3 percent, FI: 3.8 percent, FR: 
5.3 percent, DE: 5.0 percent, ES: 4.3 percent). One can consider these households 
as society’s economic elite.
Owners belong to all wealth and income groups, but are less often found at the 
very bottom of the wealth or income distribution. Again, the share of wealth- poor 
Figure 2. Allocation of Households to Groups 
Notes: The figures show the allocation of households to groups. The top panel shows the allocation 
for the entire Euro Area. The bottom panels show results for a country with a high share of renters 
(Austria) and a country with a relatively low share of renters (Finland). IQ 1 to IQ 5 refer to the groups 
formed by gross income quintiles, and WQ 1 to WQ 5 to the groups formed by net worth quintiles. 
Interactive versions of the plots are available upon request. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the second wave of the HFCS.
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owners varies across countries along with home- ownership rates but is— given the 
low home- ownership rate— surprisingly high in Germany (Euro Area: 6.4 percent, 
AT: 0.5 percent, FI: 6.8 percent, FR: 1.9 percent, DE: 5.0 percent, ES: 33.7 percent).
3. HybRid Mdina
3.1. Structure
Net worth is defined as total assets minus liabilities. Highly comparable vari-
ables (as indicated in Table 2) form the integrated account of  the hybrid MDINA. 
All other variables currently enter MDINA as part of the supplement account. 
This is a very conservative approach. The number of linkable variables is likely to 
increase in the course of the work of the EG- LMM. Housing wealth is part of the 
supplement account but can be interpreted as integrated by following the pseudo 
link presented in Appendix A.
Table 7 shows the structure of the hybrid MDINA listing all the variables that 
enter either the integrated or supplement (pseudo- integrated) account.
3.2. Integration
Integration requires distributional breakdowns to sum up to NA totals. This 
is achieved by proportionally scaling group- specific HFCS sub- aggregates guar-
anteeing the preservation of the distributional attributes. Before scaling, I apply 
an adjustment of the top tail, which is needed to obtain comparable results across 
countries as argued in subsection 2.4.
Let yj denote the NA aggregate for component j entering the integrated 
account and
the corresponding top- tail adjusted HFCS aggregate, whereas xI
i,j
 denotes the 
group- specific sub- aggregates for group i. In the case of groups formed by wealth 
quintiles, xI
5,j






StRuctuRe of HybRid Mdina
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In the case of groups formed by income quintiles or qualitative characteristics, 
the allocation of adjusted wealth to groups is slightly more complicated. The top 
tail is divided into four strata determined by net worth, and each stratum contains 
25 percent of the households in the tail. The share of total wealth held by each 
group is calculated within each stratum. The adjusted tail wealth for each instru-
ment and stratum is re- distributed to groups following the originally observed 
shares. This means that all groups may be affected by the top- tail adjustment. In 
practice, the top income quintile usually receives larger proportions of the added 
wealth because of the correlation between wealth and income. As capitalists are 
predominately found among the wealthiest households, this group is also affected 
more than renters and owners (Figure 3).
Distributional indicators for component j and group i are given by
Thus, each group- specific aggregate aI
i,j
 is scaled by its inverse coverage ratio 
and the aggregate equals the NA total
The effect of scaling is large, as coverage ratios tend to be disappointingly 
low— even for conceptually highly comparable instruments (see Table 8).25
For housing wealth, the coverage ratios are per construction equal to 100 per-
cent as a consequence of the pseudo link described in subsection A.4, thus
Components entering the supplement account are not scaled but enter the 
account directly, that is,
3.3. Summary Statistics for MDINA
MDINA summarize the wealth distribution across several dimensions— the 

















25The top- tail adjustment generally increases coverage ratios, but for most instruments they are still 
far from 100 percent. As Chakraborty and Waltl (2018) argue, this probably reflects errors along many 
more dimensions in the survey and the national accounts alike. As noted before in Table 5, because of 
the general high reliability of the integrated variables in the national accounts, aggregates are preferred 
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groups. For comparisons across countries and time, it is helpful to summarize 
MDINA along a particular dimension in one single number. There are several 
options to do so, and I consider in this article up to five different summary statis-
tics describing the set of information within MDINA.
For breakdowns by wealth itself, I also provide top wealth shares, that is, the 
share of (component- specific) wealth held by the wealthiest 5 percent or 10 per-
cent. This information is additional and cannot be directly derived from MDINA.
The summary statistics considered are ratios of average holdings across 
extreme quintiles, absolute distances between average holdings across quintile 
groups, and a between- group inequality measure inspired by the Theil index.
A(X) denotes the average holding of a specific component of wealth or net 
worth among group X; for example, A(I) is the average among the lowest quintile. 
Relating the extreme groups, namely, the top 20 percent to the bottom 20 percent, 
measures the dispersion of a specific component of wealth along the dimensions 
of the vertical groups. A ratio of, say, A (V ) ∕A (I ) = 5 thus implies that a house-
hold belonging to the top 20 percent (in terms of income or wealth) owns on aver-
age five times more than a household belonging to the bottom 20 percent.
Figure 3. Top- Tail Adjustment: Distribution to Vertical Groups 
Notes: The figure shows how the additional euros stemming from the top- tail adjustment are 
distributed among vertical groups: the top tail is divided into four strata representing the four quartiles 
of the tail in terms of net worth; that is, the fourth quartile represents the wealthiest of the wealthy. 
Additional wealth is distributed to strata following the estimated Pareto model. Within each stratum, 
this added wealth is distributed to each component of wealth by replicating portfolio structures within 
the stratum (see Chakraborty and Waltl, 2018). When vertical groups refer to anything other than 
wealth, another re- distribution has to be performed: Within each stratum- specific component, the 
original distribution of the total across, say, income quintiles (IQ 1 to IQ 5), is mapped on the added 
wealth. For example, the adjusted total of component 1 belonging to IQ 4 in the tail is given by the sum 
of the shaded areas.
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For some components (and regularly also net worth) average holdings among 
group I are negative and thus the standard ratio is not meaningful. Therefore, I 
also relate average holdings among the top 20 percent to average holdings among 
the bottom 40 percent, A (V ) ∕A (I ∪ II ). Therefore, A (V ) ∕A (I ∪ II ) = 5 indicates 
that a household belonging to the top 20 percent owns, on average, five times more 
than a household belonging to the bottom 40 percent.
Similarly, I also calculate the absolute distance between average hold-
ings among the top 20 percent and the bottom 20 percent or 40 percent, that is, 
|A (V ) −A (I )| and A (V ) −A (I ∪ II ).
These quintile summary statistics are not meaningful for qualitative or other 
unordered breakdowns such as, in this article, functions of wealth. Therefore, I 
impute a measure of between- groups inequality inspired by the Theil index (Theil, 
1967). The Theil index is an additively separable inequality measure; that is, over-
all inequality can be additively decomposed into within- groups and between- 
groups inequality. To summarize MDINA, the between- groups part is the relevant 
measure.
The index number itself  does not have an intuitive interpretation, but facili-
tates relative comparisons. Because of relation of the Theil index to negative 
entropy, a larger index is associated with a larger distance from the uniform distri-
bution, that is, the distance to perfect equality along the dimension of the vertical 
grouping. The Theil index is again not defined for non- positive wealth.26
The Theil index (or more precisely the Theil T index) is defined as
where n denotes the population total, aj the wealth held by household j, and
the average wealth across the population. The Theil index can be formulated for 
each component of wealth. For g groups (the vertical groups of MDINA), the 
Theil index decomposes into
where Ti is the group- specific Theil index, ni the number of households in group i, 
and ai the average wealth in group i. Consequently, si denotes the share of wealth 
held by group i. The first term describes inequality within the groups, and the sec-
ond term inequality between groups. When population totals are known, it is pos-
sible to directly compute the between- group part from MDINA,
26Thus, an overall Theil index comprising within- and between- groups inequality cannot be com-
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This measure is reported for all vertical groupings.
3.4. Interpretation of Hybrid MDINA
This section highlights some quantitative results and potential uses of hybrid 
MDINA. The full set of results for Austria, Finland, France, Germany, and Spain 
are reported in Appendix C. These tables also allow one to easily compute further 
measures, for example, inequality measures based on a truncated definition of total 
wealth.
Wealth is highly concentrated at the very top of the distribution: the top 
wealth group possesses substantial shares of total wealth (AT: 81.4 percent, FI: 
66.4 percent, FR: 70.9 percent, DE: 81.5 percent, ES: 66.6 percent), whereas net 
worth is negative in the poorest group in Austria, Finland, and Germany. In France 
and Spain, the amount is positive but very small. Ignoring vehicles and valuables, 
the poorest group would also have negative wealth in France and Spain.
Average net worth among the wealthiest 20 percent is more than 200 times 
higher than among the bottom 40 percent in Austria. This ratio is approximately 70 
in Finland, 50 in France, and 25 in Spain. In Germany, average net worth among 
the bottom 40 percent is still negative.
The wealthiest of the wealthy hold large shares of wealth in all countries ana-
lyzed in this article. Austria has again the highest inequality when analyzed from 
this angle: after adjusting for the missing wealthy, the top 5 percent are found to 
own 57 percent of total net worth. In the remaining countries, this share ranges 
between 37 percent in Spain and 46 percent in Germany.
When assessing the distribution of wealth relative to income groups, the 
concentration is less extreme; that is, there is a strong but no perfect correlation 
between income and wealth: the 20 percent highest income households respectively 
possess “only” 55.4 percent (AT), 48.5 percent (FI), 58.0 percent (FR), 61.6 percent 
(DE), and 48.3 percent (ES) of total wealth. The lowest- income group holds small 
but consistently positive shares of total wealth (AT: 3.3 percent, FI: 6.4 percent, 
FR: 6.0 percent, DE: 4.3 percent, ES: 8.9 percent). The poorest groups in terms of 
income consistently also have on average the lowest net worth.
Wealth inequality measured against income groups is again highest in Austria 
and Germany, and lowest in Finland and Spain: the 20 percent income- richest 
households are on average five to six times wealthier than the 40 percent lowest- 
income households in Finland and Spain. This measure approximately amounts to 
11 in Austria, 9 in France, and 10 in Germany. The Tbetween measure confirms this 
ordering of countries.
In most countries, average per household wealth is larger than the average 
wealth of a household in the fourth wealth quintile and the fourth income quintile. 
Thus, the frequently communicated number of average household wealth is not ide-
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Across the entire Euro Area, 36.9 percent of the households are identified 
as renters, 48.6 percent as non- capitalist owners, and 14.6 percent as capitalists. 
Although the share of capitalists does not vary substantially across countries 
(between 9 percent in AT and 16 percent in ES), the shares of renters and owners, 
respectively, vary significantly.
Average net worth is consistently lowest for renters and highest for capitalists. 
The average net worth of owners is usually close but slightly lower than the overall 
average (average wealth of an owner is slightly higher only in Finland).
Although capitalists form the smallest group, collectively they hold substan-
tially more wealth than renters or owners. Only in Finland, the group of owners 
(55 percent of all households) collectively holds more wealth than the 12.5 percent 
capitalist households.
Analyzing Tbetween, the German- speaking countries again show the highest 
inequality, and Spain and Finland the lowest inequality along the dimension of 
functions of wealth. It is interesting that the gap between France and the two 
German- speaking countries is smaller than for other dimensions.
Macroeconomic shocks related to, for instance, stock prices or house prices 
will transmit very differently across the economy because of different degrees of 
exposure: Some asset price shocks have an impact on a large proportion of housh-
olds while others affect only few. The detailed breakdowns provided by MDINA 
facilitate modeling and monitoring on such a dis- aggregated level.
Business wealth is heavily concentrated at the top of the distribution: in 
Austria and Germany, the wealthiest 20 percent own approximately 97 percent of 
total business wealth. This share is lower, but still above 90 percent, in the other 
countries. Total holdings in listed shares are predominantly owned by the top 
wealth groups; that is, up to 90 percent of stock market wealth is held by just 20 
percent of all households. The concentration is less dramatic but still substantial 
when looking at the highest income group (AT: 76.0 percent, FI: 78.2 percent, FR: 
76.0 percent, DE: 82.1 percent, ES: 69.7 percent).
Housing wealth constitutes the most important asset class in all countries. It 
is less unequally distributed than business wealth and forms the most important 
asset class for non- capitalist owners. Owner- occupied housing constitutes the larg-
est share of total housing wealth across all countries and across groups formed 
by wealth or income. Non- owner- occupied housing assets become relatively more 
important in households’ portfolios when moving up the distribution (see also 
Figure 12). Cross- country differences in the degree of housing wealth inequality 
are largely determined by differences in home- ownership rates, which are substan-
tially lower in Germany and Austria than in other countries (see Figure 24 and 
Figure 11).
The fundamental differences in the spread of holdings in financial and hous-
ing wealth may also help explain the different magnitudes of the macroeconomic 
wealth effect: Case et al. (2005) and Bostic et al. (2009) document a much larger 
effect of changes in housing prices on aggregate consumption compared with 
changes in stock market prices or financial wealth in general.
The lowest wealth groups predominantly possess wealth in the form of depos-
its, vehicles, and low amounts of housing wealth. Overall, the total value of vehi-
cles is similarly large as total holdings in listed shares. Vehicles are, however, less 
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unequally distributed across wealth or income groups. In fact, the relative impor-
tance of these unproductive assets in households’ portfolios is substantial for the 
two lowest wealth groups (see Figure 12).
The breakdown by functions of wealth sheds more light onto the potential 
effects of house price booms: owners experience an increase in wealth, whereas 
capitalists experience an increase in both, wealth and income, because of rising 
rents. The homes of capitalists are on average more valuable; thus the increase in 
wealth is greater for this group. Renters are often found at the lower end of the 
wealth distribution and are much more likely to be found in the lower half  of the 
income distribution than in the upper half. In flexible rental markets, house price 
booms may thus potentially redistribute from a relatively vulnerable group to the 
small group of capitalists that are typically wealth- and income- rich.
Capitalists are not only overall wealthier than owners or renters; they indeed 
outperform other types of households in every single asset category. They also have on 
average larger debts, which may reflect their increased investment opportunities and 
activities. Capitalists are on average slightly less wealthy than the top wealth group.
As business wealth, stocks, and funds are predominantly held by capitalists, 
booming markets lead to direct gains for these households. By contrast, the wealth- 
poorest group hardly possesses any productive assets (bonds, investment funds, 
and business wealth): on average, less than EUR 1,000 in total in all countries 
except Spain. In Austria, France, and Germany, the average amount is even below 
EUR 500. This means that a booming economy does not directly impact their eco-
nomic situation, and thus no transmission via a wealth effect is possible.
Stock market booms may have no direct impact on the lowest wealth group as 
holdings in stocks and investment funds together range on average between EUR 
100 and EUR 350 only. In addition, the second, third, and fourth wealth quintiles 
possess on average rather small amounts of stocks and funds.
Only the top wealth group, who possess on average roughly EUR 70,000 in 
stocks and funds, can potentially earn substantial amounts from these assets, and 
thus directly benefit from a stock market boom. Similarly, the top income group 
owns on average roughly EUR 60,000 in stocks and funds, and could thus directly 
benefit from a booming stock market. On the contrary, in the case of falling stock 
market prices negative wealth effects are also not to be expected among large sec-
tions of society.
The distribution of debts stands out for Spain, where they are large and evenly 
spread across wealth groups. Average debts among the wealthiest 20 percent are 
just 1.3 times the average debts among the poorest households. One explanation 
is the extraordinary housing boom at the beginning of the century that motivated 
many people to invest in real estate. After the bust, many were left with substantial 
mortgage debts. Thus, the share of owners with mortgages is large across all wealth 
groups (see Figures 11 and 12).
4. concluSionS
This article discusses a framework to compile Multidimensional Distributional 
National Accounts (MDINA). A partial integration of distributional information 
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into the System of National Accounts (SNA) is suggested, but the article points 
out the importance of an extended list of variables to achieve a measure of total 
marketable wealth. This partial integration is termed Hybrid MDINA. Hybrid 
MDINA are also feasible when links between micro- and macro- data are not (yet) 
well established for all variables, as a step- by- step integration process is possible 
without changes in definitions hindering comparability over time.
The suggested framework for MDINA is suited to serve two functions: first, 
MDINA establish a link between aggregate macroeconomic indicators and the 
system of measuring macroeconomic activity, the national accounts. The linkage 
enables an understanding of the allocation of gains and costs associated with mac-
roeconomic trends and, vice versa, monitoring the influence of inequality on the 
wider economy. Second, MDINA constitute by themselves a comprehensive mea-
sure of wealth inequality, which thus needs to cover all relevant components of 
marketable wealth.
The article further stresses the importance of meaningful vertical groups of 
MDINA. Groupings by wealth, income, and functions of wealth are provided. 
Regarding the latter, the article distinguishes between renters, owners, and capi-
talists, which represent three functions of wealth: provision, own use, and income 
generation. In addition, suitable summary statistics are derived to provide an ade-
quate overall picture of inequality along these dimensions.
In the empirical section, I combine survey (HFCS) and NA data to compile 
MDINA for Austria, Finland, France, Germany, and Spain.
One major problem of wealth surveys is the insufficient coverage of the 
wealthiest households. As wealth is heavily concentrated at the very top of the 
distribution, exclusively relying on surveys therefore leads to an underestimation 
of the degree of wealth inequality and biased MDINA. Therefore, I perform a 
top- tail correction making use of rich list data, which exist in all five countries 
analyzed. For France and Spain, additional information on the concentration of 
wealth at the top exists: top wealth shares derived from (predominantly) tax data 
as well as adjusted wealth shares considering wealth held in offshore tax havens. 
These additional pieces of information are used to estimate either a Pareto or a 
Generalized Pareto distribution that substitutes the top tail in the survey. Top- tail 
adjustments based on rich lists or adjusted top wealth shares lead to very similar 
results. Making use of unadjusted top wealth shares led to slightly smaller overall 
changes both in France and Spain. The importance of this adjustment correlates 
with the quality of the survey design in terms of the use of administrative data and 
the applied oversampling strategy. For reasons of comparability, a top- tail adjust-
ment thus appears to be essential.
A high level of wealth inequality is found along all three dimensions analyzed 
in this article: wealth groups, income groups, and functions of wealth. Highest 
inequality is usually documented for Austria and Germany, whereas inequality is 
lowest in Spain and Finland. France consistently lies in between. Different com-
ponents of wealth show substantial differences in the degree of inequality: finan-
cial wealth (excluding deposits) is much more unequally distributed than housing 
wealth, deposits, or vehicles. Vehicles, an unproductive asset class, are very import-
ant among poorer households, but overall the total value of vehicles appears to be 
similarly high as total holdings in funds or stocks.
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This article applies the proposed framework to one survey wave only. With 
every additional survey wave, such MDINA could be re- estimated and thus yield a 
comprehensive monitoring tool over time.
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